

# Shannon's Theory of Secure Communication

CSG 252      Lecture 2

September 23, 2006

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# Introduction

- Last time, we have seen various cryptosystems, and some cryptanalyses
- How do you ascertain the security of a cryptosystem?
- Some reasonable ideas:
  - **Computational Security**: best alg takes a long time
    - No one knows how to get that (impossible?)
    - Can be done against specific attacks (brute-force search)
  - **Provable Security**: reduce the security of a cryptosystem to a problem believed (or known) to be hard
  - **Unconditional Security**: Cryptosystem cannot be broken even with infinite computation power

# Review of Probability Theory

- Security generally expressed in terms of probability
  - Because an attacker can always guess the key!
  - This is true of any cryptosystem, and unavoidable
- We only need discrete probabilities for now

# Probability Distributions

- Probability space:  $(\Omega, \text{Pr})$ 
  - $\Omega$ , the **sample space**, is a finite set of possible states (or possible worlds or possible outcomes)
  - $\text{Pr}$  is a function  $P(\Omega) \rightarrow [0,1]$  such that
    - $\text{Pr}(\Omega) = 1$
    - $\text{Pr}(\emptyset) = 0$
    - $\text{Pr}(A \cup B) = \text{Pr}(A) + \text{Pr}(B)$  if  $A \cap B = \emptyset$
  - $\text{Pr}$  is called a **probability distribution**, a **probability measure**, or just a probability
- Because of additivity,  $\text{Pr}$  determined by  $\text{Pr}(\{a\}) \forall a$

# Examples

- Single die:
  - $\Omega = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
  - $\Pr(\{4\}) = 1/6$
  - $\Pr(\{1,3,5\}) = 3/6 = 1/2$
- Pair of dice:
  - $\Omega = \{(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),\dots,(6,5),(6,6)\}$
  - $\Pr(\{(1,1)\}) = 1/36$
  - $\Pr(\{(1,a) \mid a=1,2,3,4\}) = 4/36 = 1/9$

# Joint Probabilities

- Suppose  $(\Omega_1, \Pr_1)$  is a probability space
- Suppose  $(\Omega_2, \Pr_2)$  is a probability space
- Can create the **joint probability space**  $(\Omega_1 \times \Omega_2, \Pr)$  by taking:
  - $\Pr(\{a, b\}) = \Pr_1(\{a\})\Pr_2(\{b\})$
  - Extending by additivity

# Conditional Probability

- $\Pr(A | B) = \Pr(A \cap B) / \Pr(B)$ 
  - Only defined if  $\Pr(B) > 0$
- More easily understood with a picture...

Bayes' Theorem:  $\Pr(B | A) = \Pr(A | B) \Pr(B) / \Pr(A)$

# Random Variables

- A **random variable** is a function from states to some set of values
- Given probability space and a random variable  $X$ , the probability that the random variable  $X$  takes value  $x$  is:

$$\Pr ( \{w \mid X(w)=x\} )$$

- This is often written  $\Pr(X=x)$  or  $\Pr[x]$  **(YUCK)**
- The probability space is often left implicit
- Conditional probabilities:  
$$\Pr (X=x \mid Y=y) = \Pr ( \{w \mid X(w)=x\} \mid \{w \mid Y(w)=y\} )$$
- $X$  and  $Y$  are **independent** if  $P(X=x \cap Y=y) = \Pr(X=x) \Pr(Y=y) \forall x,y$



# Application to Cryptography

- Suppose a probability space  $(\Omega, \Pr)$  with:
  - Random variable  $K$  (=key)
  - Random variable  $P$  (=plaintext)
  - $K$  and  $P$  are independent random variables
    - Simple example: states are (key, plaintext) pairs
- Key probability is  $\Pr(K=k)$
- Plaintext probability is  $\Pr(P=x)$

# Ciphertext Probability

- This induces a probability over ciphertexts:

$$\Pr(C = y) = \sum_{x, k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(P = x) \Pr(K = k)$$

- Can compute conditional probabilities:

$$\Pr(C = y \cap P = x) = \Pr(P = x) \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)$$

$$\Pr(C = y \mid P = x) = \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)$$

$$\Pr(P = x \mid C = y) = \frac{\Pr(P = x) \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)}{\sum_{x', k \bullet e_k(x') = y} \Pr(P = x') \Pr(K = k)}$$

# Perfect Secrecy

- We say a cryptosystem has **perfect secrecy** if

$$\Pr (P=x \mid C=y) = \Pr (P=x) \quad \text{for all } x,y$$

- The probability that the plaintext is  $x$  given that you have observed ciphertext  $y$  is the same as the probability that the plaintext is  $x$  (without seeing the ciphertext)
- Depends on key probability and plaintext probability

# Characterizing Perfect Secrecy

Theorem: The shift cipher, where all keys have probability  $1/26$ , has perfect secrecy if we use the key only once, for any plaintext probability.

- Can we characterize those cryptosystems with perfect secrecy?

Theorem: Let  $(P,C,K,E,D)$  be a cryptosystem with  $|K| = |P| = |C|$ . This cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if and only if all keys have the same probability  $1/|K|$  and

$$\forall x \in P \quad \forall y \in C \quad \exists k \in K \quad \bullet \quad e_k(x) = y$$

# Vernam Cipher

- Also known as the **one-time pad**
- $P = C = K = (\mathbb{Z}_2)^n$ 
  - Strings of bits of length  $n$
- If  $K=(k_1, \dots, k_n)$ :
  - $e_K(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (x_1+k_1 \pmod{2}, \dots, x_n+k_n \pmod{2})$
  - $d_K(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (x_1-k_1 \pmod{2}, \dots, x_n-k_n \pmod{2})$
- To encrypt a string of length  $N$ , choose a one-time pad of length  $N$

# Conclusions

- If ciphertexts are short (same length as key), can get perfect security
  - Approach still used for very sensitive data (embassies, military, etc)
- But keys get very long for long messages
- And there is the whole key distribution problem
  
- Modern cryptosystems: one key used to encrypt long plaintext (by breaking it into pieces)
  - We will see more of these next time
  
- Need to be able to reason about reusing keys

# A Detour: Entropy

- **Entropy**: measure of uncertainty (in bits) introduced by Shannon in 1948
  - Foundation of Information Theory
- Intuition
  - Suppose a random variable that takes value  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  with some nonzero probability
  - Consider the string of values generated by that probability distribution
  - What is the most efficient way (in number of bits) to encode every value to minimize how many bits it take to encode a random string?
  - Example:  $\{1, \dots, 8\}$ , where 8 is much more likely than others

# Definition of Entropy

- Let random variable take values in finite set  $V$

$$H(X) = - \sum_{v \in V} Pr(X = v) \log_2 Pr(X = v)$$

- Weighted average of  $-\log_2 Pr(X=v)$

Theorem: Suppose  $X$  is a random variable taking  $n$  values with nonzero probability, then

$$H(X) \leq \log_2(n)$$

- When do we have equality?



# Huffman Encoding

Algorithm to get a  $\{0,1\}$  encoding that takes less than  $H(X)+1$  bits on average

1. Start with a table of letter probabilities
2. Create a list of trees, initially all trees with only a letter and associated probability
3. Iteratively:
  - a. Pick the two trees  $T_1, T_2$  with smallest probabilities from the list
  - b. Create a small tree with edge 0 leading to  $T_1$  and edge 1 leading to  $T_2$
  - c. Add that tree back to the list, with probability the sum of the original probabilities
4. Stop when you get a single tree giving the encoding

# Conditional Entropy

- Let  $X$  and  $Y$  be random variables
- Fix a value  $y$  of  $Y$
- Define the random variable  $X|y$  such that
$$\Pr(X|y = x) = \Pr(X=x | Y=y)$$

$$H(X | y) = - \sum_{v \in V} \Pr(X = v | Y = y) \log_2 \Pr(X = v | Y = y)$$

- Conditional entropy, written  $H(X|Y)$ :

$$H(X | Y) = \sum_y \Pr(Y = y) H(X | y)$$

- Intuition: average amount of information about  $X$  that remains after observing  $Y$

# Application to Cryptography

- **Key equivocation**  $H(K | C)$ : amount of uncertainty of the key that remains after observing the ciphertext

$$\text{Theorem: } H(K | C) = H(K) + H(P) - H(C)$$

- A **spurious key** is a possible key, but incorrect
  - E.g., shift cipher, with ciphertext WNAJW
  - Possible keys:  $k=5$  (RIVER) or  $k=22$  (ARENA)
- Many spurious keys ----> Good!

# How Many Spurious Keys?

- Question: how long of a message can we permit before the number of spurious keys is 0?
  - That is, before the only key that is possible is the right one?
- This depends on the underlying language in which plaintexts are taken
- Cf: cryptanalysis, where we took advantage that not all letters have equal probability in English messages

# Entropy of a Language

- $H_L$  = number of information bits per letter in language L
- Example:
  - If all letters have the same probability, a first approximation would be 4.7
  - For English, based on probabilities of plaintexts (letters), a first approximation is 4.19
  - For pairs of letters? Triplets of letters? ...

- Entropy of L: 
$$H_L = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{H(P^n)}{n}$$

- Redundancy of L: 
$$R_L = 1 - \frac{H_L}{\log_2 |P|}$$

# Unicity Distance

Theorem: Suppose  $(P,C,K,E,D)$  is a cryptosystem with  $|C| = |P|$  and keys are chosen equiprobably, and let  $L$  be the underlying language. Given a ciphertext of length  $n$  (sufficiently large), the expected number of spurious keys  $s_n$  satisfies

$$s_n \geq \frac{|K|}{|P|^{nR_L}} - 1$$

- The **unicity distance** of a cryptosystem is the value  $n_0$  after which the number expected number of spurious keys is 0.
  - Average amount of ciphertext required for an adversary to be able to compute the key (given enough time)
- Substitution cipher:  $n_0 = 25$ 
  - So have a chance to recover the key if encrypted message is longer than 25 characters