Wed 09.30.20
Wed 09.30.20
Wed 09.30.20
Wed 09.30.20
In this project, we have focused on analyzing security vulnerabilities in the latest 5G systems and developing and analyzing provably secure solutions that protect against sophisticated attacks targeting resiliency, security and privacy.
The 3GPP 5G cellular system is hailed as a major step towards a ubiquitous and pervasive communications infrastructure. It is indeed flexible and extensible, with slices to support a variety of unique applications requirements, from Massive IoT (MIoT), Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), to enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), and massive Machine Type Communications (mMTC), as well as specific industry requirements such as V2X, Smart Grid, and Remote Healthcare. This capability to address unique needs, along with the redesign around Service Based Architecture, and Network Functions Virtualization is very promising to adequately support a larger number of applications including critical ones such as self-driving cars, robotics, and remote surgeries.
Cellular systems, however, have a history of security, privacy, and robustness issues since their second generation (GSM) that took security and privacy more seriously. Over the years, we and other researchers around the world were able to demonstrate attacks against every generation of cellular systems from 2G to 4G, by preying on design, implementation, and operation flaws. We have been analyzing the security, robustness, privacy of 5G systems and devising protections for current and future generations of cellular communications systems.
Our research runs along three main axes: (1) analysis of security and privacy threats, (2) design and implementation of countermeasures, and (3) testbed setup and experimental validations. We identified several vulnerabilities in the 5G design pertaining to both DoD networks and general networks (e.g., the ability to stealthily spoof the 5G signal synchronization block with emissions 3.4dB below the legitimate signal). We developed several mitigations, implemented them, and evaluated them in our testbed using the 5G Open Air Interface platform. We are interested in the security of both Radio Access Network (RAN) and the Core Network.
The project aims to benefit both DoD and commercial systems.
In this project, we have focused on analyzing security vulnerabilities in the latest 5G systems and developing and analyzing provably secure solutions that protect against sophisticated attacks targeting resiliency, security and privacy.
The 3GPP 5G cellular system is hailed as a major step towards a ubiquitous and pervasive communications infrastructure. It is indeed flexible and extensible, with slices to support a variety of unique applications requirements, from Massive IoT (MIoT), Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), to enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), and massive Machine Type Communications (mMTC), as well as specific industry requirements such as V2X, Smart Grid, and Remote Healthcare. This capability to address unique needs, along with the redesign around Service Based Architecture, and Network Functions Virtualization is very promising to adequately support a larger number of applications including critical ones such as self-driving cars, robotics, and remote surgeries.
Cellular systems, however, have a history of security, privacy, and robustness issues since their second generation (GSM) that took security and privacy more seriously. Over the years, we and other researchers around the world were able to demonstrate attacks against every generation of cellular systems from 2G to 4G, by preying on design, implementation, and operation flaws. We have been analyzing the security, robustness, privacy of 5G systems and devising protections for current and future generations of cellular communications systems.
Our research runs along three main axes: (1) analysis of security and privacy threats, (2) design and implementation of countermeasures, and (3) testbed setup and experimental validations. We identified several vulnerabilities in the 5G design pertaining to both DoD networks and general networks (e.g., the ability to stealthily spoof the 5G signal synchronization block with emissions 3.4dB below the legitimate signal). We developed several mitigations, implemented them, and evaluated them in our testbed using the 5G Open Air Interface platform. We are interested in the security of both Radio Access Network (RAN) and the Core Network.
The project aims to benefit both DoD and commercial systems.
