# Functional Encryption (FE)

Tuesday, October 6, 2020 11:44 AM

Recall ABE:




- learn m if P(x) = true (functionality)
- otherwise m hidden (security w/ collusion)
- always learn x

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Predicate enc (PE)

only learn x if P(x) = true

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Functional Enc (FE)




- functionality: learn f(x)
- security: nothing else

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ABE $x = (x', m)$ $f(x)$: $(x', m)$ if $P(x') = true$

↳ PE ~~$x'$~~ $\perp$ otherwise

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ABE/PE/FE: can exchange f, X.

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FE security (non-adaptive)

adv chooses $\{f_i\}_{i \in [m]}, \{x_j\}_{j \in [\ell]}$

- Simulation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} mpk \\ sk_{f_1}, \ldots, sk_{f_m} \\ ct(x_1), \ldots, ct(x_\ell) \end{bmatrix} \approx Sim\left(\{f_i\}_{i \in [m]}, \{f_i(x_j)\}_{i,j}\right)$$

$$\left( \begin{matrix} \cdot\, sk_1, \ldots, sk_n \\ ct(x_1), \ldots, ct(x_\ell) \end{matrix} \right) \approx Sim\left( \{f_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{f_i(x_j)\}_{i,j} \right)$$

unachievable! think of $f_i(x_j) = PRF(x_j, i)$

- Ind Security: Adv chooses $\{f_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, $x_0, x_1$ s.t. $f_i(x_0) = f_i(x_1)$ $\forall i$

$$(mpk, \{sk_{f_i}\}, ct(x_0)) \approx (mpk, \{sk_{f_i}\}, ct(x_1))$$

$\Leftrightarrow$ Ind. Obfuscation

- no-collusion FE
  - adv sees single secret key $sk_f$.

→ symmetric-key no-collusion simulation sec FE : need msk to encrypt (CPA-attack security)

↑ ‖

garbled circuits

$$\{K_{i,b}\}_{i \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}$$

"garble"

$C \longrightarrow \tilde{C}$

"garble"

$x \longrightarrow \tilde{x} = \{K_{i,x_i}\}$

$\tilde{C}, \tilde{x} \rightarrow C(x)$

security: $(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x}) \approx Sim(C(x))$

Garbled circuits $\Rightarrow$ Sym. Key FE

$ct(C) = \tilde{C}$

$SK_x = \tilde{x}$

No collusion (one-key), many ctext simulation secure.

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Garbled circuits + PKE $\Rightarrow$ PK FE

$$mpk = \begin{bmatrix} pk_{1,0} & \cdots & pk_{n,0} \\ pk_{1,1} & \cdots & pk_{n,1} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$msk = \begin{bmatrix} sk_{1,0} & & sk_{n,0} \\ & \cdots & \\ sk_{1,1} & & sk_{n,1} \end{bmatrix}$$

$SK_x = \{SK_i, x_i\}$

$ct(C) = \tilde{C}, \quad Enc(pk_{i,b}, k_{i,b})$